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Abstract

This chapter emphasizes the common denominators of the remedies available to the
victim in torts and contracts. Some remedies which are more typical of either contracts
or torts are also discussed. The topics covered by the chapter are liability rules vs.
property rules, specific performance vs. damages, the foreseeability requirement, tort
liability for pure economic losses and non-pecuniary losses, caps on consequential
damages, damages for bodily injury and lost income, liquidated damages, probabilistic
recoveries and offsetting risks.
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Introduction
Analyzing the substantive law without its remedial part is almost meaningless. If we
knew that the law imposes liability for negligence or for breach of a contract, but knew
nothing about the remedies to which the victim is entitled in case his rights are infringed,
we would know very little about the impact of the law on the real world. Therefore, in all
legal systems the remedies are interlinked with the substantive law. In civil legal systems
the same code which allocates entitlements among the parties also sets the remedies for
protecting those entitlements. In both civil and common law legal systems it is hard to
imagine a court deciding a substantive law dispute without taking into account, explicitly
or implicitly, the remedies which are available to victims. Indeed, it is hard to imagine the
creation of the substantive law, either by legislatures or courts, without careful
consideration of the remedial consequences of its breach.
The claim that substantive law and remedies are interlinked with one another
might imply that each legal field must have its own unique remedies. If that were the
case, remedies would not be an independent topic, but rather a subtopic in each and every
substantive field of the law.1 This implication, however, is wrong. Remedies in different
legal fields have much in common, and the study of remedies as a topic can teach us a lot,
especially when the goals of the substantive legal fields are similar (Cooter 1985).
Consider tort law and contract law. Under its efficiency rationale, tort law should
minimize social costs, thereby enhancing social welfare. In order to achieve this goal, tort
law should provide incentives for both the injurer and the victim to take efficient
precautions. Similarly, contract law should also provide the parties with efficient
incentives, in order to enable them to maximize the contractual surplus. In both torts and
contracts providing the injurer/promisor and the victim/promisee with efficient incentives
is done through a combination of substantive and remedial law. It should therefore come
as no surprise that the remedies in both legal fields share much in common.

1

In most law schools in common law jurisdictions, an important part of the Contract Law or the Tort Law
class is remedies (for breaching a contract or for wrongfully inflicting harm, respectively), and only few
law schools offer a Remedies class.
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This chapter emphasizes the common denominators of the remedies in torts and
contracts. Some remedies which are more typical of either contracts or torts are also
discussed. While the remedies in both fields are similar, they are not identical, and often
are adapted to the legal context to which they apply.

I. Property Rules and Liability Rules
A. General Framework
In a seminal article, Calabresi and Melamed distinguished between the allocation of
entitlements and the remedies for protecting them, as two distinct stages in promoting
efficiency (Calabresi and Melamed 1972). In particular, they argued that once
entitlements are allocated, they can be protected by either property or liability rules.
Under a property rule, no one is allowed to deprive the owner of his entitlement without
his consent; under a liability rule, other people are allowed to do so, but must compensate
the owner for his losses. Thus, suppose Polluter inflicts harm on Resident. The law
should allocate an entitlement, either to Resident to live without the pollution or to
Polluter to pollute without interference. Assume first that the law made the former
choice, so that the entitlement is allocated to Resident. Now a second choice must be
made: to protect the entitlement with either a property rule or a liability rule. Under a
property rule, Resident can sue Polluter in court and get an injunction, prohibiting further
pollution (rule 1, in Calabresi & Melamed’s terms); under a liability rule, Resident is
entitled to compensation only, so it is Polluter’s choice whether to stop polluting, or
instead pollute and compensate Resident for his losses (rule 2, in Calabresi & Melamed’s
terms).
Assume next that the law allocated the entitlement to Polluter rather than to
Resident. Here too Polluter’s entitlement can be protected with either a property or a
liability rule. Under a property rule, no one can stop Polluter from polluting without his
consent (rule 3); under a liability rule, Resident can stop Polluter from polluting even
without his consent, but if she chooses to do so she should compensate Polluter for the
harm he suffers due to stopping the pollution (rule 4). The four rules are summarized in
the table below:
3

Entitlement

Protection

Rule 1

Resident

property rule

Rule 2

Resident

liability rule

Rule 3

Polluter

Property rule

Rule 4

Polluter

Liability rule

Calabresi & Melamed analyzed the efficiency considerations in making the
choices with regard to allocating and protecting the entitlements. First they argued that
when transaction costs are low it does not really matter, from an efficiency (rather than a
distributional) perspective, whether the entitlement is allocated to Polluter or Resident: as
the Coase Theorem teaches us (Coase 1960), with low transaction costs the parties would
reach the efficient solution regardless of the initial allocation of entitlements. Thus, if
Polluter is the cheapest cost-avoider and rule 1 applies he would take measures to prevent
the harm (otherwise Resident would get an injunction in court, prohibiting pollution); if
rule 3 applies instead, Resident would offer Polluter a payment to stop polluting and
Polluter would accept the offer. The same reasoning applies to the reverse case when
Resident is the cheapest cost-avoider: Resident would either take measures to avoid the
harm (under rule 3) or be paid by Polluter to do the same thing (under rule 1).
Things become more complicated when transaction costs are high, which makes
contracting between the parties either hard or impossible. Here it is necessary to
distinguish between two scenarios: first, when the cheapest cost-avoider can be
identified; and second, when it is unknown who the cheapest cost-avoider is or if there is
one at all. In the first scenario, the entitlement should be allocated to the party who is not
the cheapest cost-avoider. Such an allocation would provide incentives to the cheapest
cost-avoider to take measures to prevent the harm. Thus, if Polluter is the cheapest costavoider, allocating the entitlement to Resident and protecting her entitlement with a
property rule (rule 1) would incentivize Polluter to prevent the harm. The same logic
applies to the reverse case when Resident is the cheapest cost-avoider: here rule 3 would
do the work.
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The second scenario is the more interesting, since it calls for liability rules.
Assume that it is impossible for either courts or legislatures to know whether stopping
pollution is efficient or not. Under those circumstances a property rule would not be an
adequate solution, since once such a rule is applied the parties might be stuck in an
inefficient situation. For example, if rule 1 is applied pollution is prohibited, so even if
pollution is efficient it will be prevented. Indeed, if the court or legislature knew that
pollution is efficient, they would apply rule 3 and restore efficiency. But once courts or
legislatures cannot know whether pollution is efficient or not, rule 2 could solve the
problem. With rule 2, Polluter must decide whether to pollute and bear the resulting harm
or stop polluting. Polluter will do whatever is cheaper for him, and that would also be
cheaper for society. Thus, if the harm is 100 and prevention costs are 50, Polluter will
stop polluting, while if prevention costs are 150, Polluter will continue to pollute. In both
cases Polluter’s interest and the societal interest align.
Rule 2 is not the only alternative for solving the problem; rule 4 could be equally
effective. Under rule 4, it is Resident rather than Polluter who decides whether to stop the
pollution or not. If she decides in the affirmative she will order Polluter to stop polluting
and reimburse him for prevention costs, but if she decides in the negative she will do
nothing and bear the harm. Thus, if the harm is 100 and prevention costs are 50, Resident
will order Polluter to stop polluting, but if the costs are 150, Resident will do nothing and
bear the harm. It is easy to see that the comparisons between harm and prevention costs
under rules 2 and 4 are exactly the same, the only difference being the identity of the
party conducting the comparison and making the decision which follows. As with
Polluter under rule 2, so too with Resident under rule 4, the interest of the party making
the decision aligns with the societal interest.
The choice between rules 2 and 4 has redistributive consequences (exactly like
the choice between rules 1 and 3): rule 2 (and 1) favors victims (Residents), while rule 4
(and 3) favors injurers (Polluters). But even if efficiency was the only consideration
which matters for the law, the choice between the two rules could make a difference. The
main efficiency consideration for choosing between the two rules is the availability of
information to the courts applying the rules and the risk of errors which follow. Thus, if
courts have better information about the harms to victims than about prevention costs,
5

rule 2 will be more efficient than rule 4, and if the reverse is true, rule 4 will be the more
efficient rule. To understand why, consider the preceding numerical example when harm
is 100 and prevention costs are 50, and assume that rule 2 applies. Efficiency-wise, the
harm should be prevented since the harm is higher than prevention costs. But suppose
now that the courts underestimate Resident’s harm—say, because they are unaware of the
high value Resident ascribes to her property—and set damages at 40 instead of 100.
Under those circumstances, Polluter will inefficiently pollute, since prevention costs are
higher than damages. Applying rule 4 could solve the problem if, but only if, the courts
estimate Polluter’s prevention costs accurately enough. Thus, if under rule 4, ordering
Polluter to stop polluting would trigger Resident’s liability of 50, Resident will compare
his harm of 100 (the realistic assumption here is that Resident accurately estimates her
own harm) with expected liability of 50, and decide to stop the pollution. In this way
efficiency would be restored. In our last example, rule 2 leads to under-deterrence; with
different numbers and overestimation of Resident’s harm by courts, rule 2 might lead to
over-deterrence. In both cases rule 4 might sometimes—but not always—solve the
problem. In other cases the reverse might be true: under- or overestimation of prevention
costs by courts may result in inefficiencies under rule 4, which rule 2 might sometimes—
but not always—ameliorate. In cases where courts’ errors are not solvable under either
rule 2 or 4 in a satisfactory manner, the case for a liability rule becomes weaker and the
case for a property rule becomes stronger. With high transaction costs, uncertainty as to
whether prevention by Polluter is efficient or not, and a high risk of courts’ errors with
respect to both harm and prevention costs, it is hard to choose between a property or
liability rule.
In the real world, rule 4 is very rarely applied (Chang 2014).2 The main reason
seems to be that in cases when transaction costs are high, typically victims are numerous
and cooperation between them—a prerequisite for rule 4’s implementation—is often
implausible due to a free-riding problem. Thus, when there are many Residents who
should decide whether to stop Polluter from polluting in return for monetary payment—
as rule 4 requires—each Resident might refuse to share the costs, knowing that if other

2

For a case where it was applied, see Spur Industries, Inc. v. Dell E. Webb Development Co., 494 P. 2d
700 (Ariz. 1972).
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Residents pay, pollution will stop anyway and she will be able to reap the benefit for free.
The same problem typically does not arise with rule 2: the injurer needs no one’s
cooperation in order to inflict harm on the victim and afterwards compensate him for it
(Porat 2009).3
B. Refinements
Calabresi & Melamed’s article has inspired many commentators who developed the
original arguments made by Calabresi & Melamed, offered new applications, and also
criticized some aspects of them. Due to limitations of space, only a few contributions to
the literature will be mentioned below.
Lucian Bebchuk pointed out that Calabresi & Melamed offered an “ex-post
analysis”; namely, an analysis that takes as a given the costs and benefits that would be
generated for the parties with and without externality-producing actions (Bebchuk 2001).
This analysis, claimed Bebchuk, does not capture the entire picture. The allocation of
entitlements and the way in which they are protected divide values between the parties
differently, and this ex-post division has a considerable impact on the parties’ ex-ante
decisions. Ex-ante decisions take place before the decisions are made whether to
undertake externality-producing actions and influence the parties’ potential payoffs with
or without these externality-producing actions. A full account of the efficiency of any
given allocation of entitlements and how they are protected—Bebchuk’s argument
goes— must consider not only the ex-post analysis but also the ex-ante analysis.
A couple of other articles, one authored by Ronen Avraham and the other by Ian
Ayres, dealt with the situation discussed in subsection A, in which the court applying a
liability rule lacks information about the values the parties ascribe to their entitlements.
Avraham and Ayres suggested sets of rules, constructed on a combination of Calabresi
and Melamed’s rules and some additional rules that can potentially encourage parties to
reveal their true valuations of their entitlements, thereby facilitating more efficient
outcomes (Avraham 2004; Ayres 1996).

3

Sometimes, however, injurers have an interest in directing their injurious activities toward the same
victim/s, since marginal harm decreases when more injurers join the existing ones. In such cases
cooperation problems among injurers would emerge (Dillbary 2013).
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Lastly, Barbara Luppi & Francesco Parisi addressed the question regarding how
remedies should be chosen when there are asymmetric transaction costs (Luppi and Parisi
2011). They defined asymmetric transaction costs as situations in which different
alternatives for reallocating resources entail different costs, such as when it is less costly
to transfer an entitlement from one use to another than in the reverse direction. Luppi &
Parisi consider the possibility of using mixed remedies in such cases; for example,
applying a property rule when A is the owner of the entitlement and B is the potential
infringer, and a liability rule if the positions of A and B are reversed.
Calabresi & Melamed’s framework is very useful in many contexts. In contract
law, for example, specific performance could be characterized as a property rule, while
damages as a liability rule. The next section further elaborates on this point.4

II. Specific Performance, Damages, and Efficient Breach
A. General Framework
There has been extensive debate in the legal literature over which remedy—specific
performance or damages—should be the primary remedy and which the exception. For
many, this debate represents a much broader dispute between law and economics and
deontological scholars over the nature and goals of the law (Shiffrin 2009; Shavell 2009;
Posner 2009). In the beginning, law and economics scholars argued that damages should
be the primary remedy since specific performance, but not damages, discourages
efficient, and therefore desirable, breaches of contract. Later, law and economics scholars
developed more nuanced arguments, showing that specific performance is often the more
efficient remedy.
The following two examples illustrate scenarios of efficient breach, and the
discussion which follows clarifies the conditions under which a damages remedy would
encourage such breaches and at the same time discourage inefficient breaches.
Example 1. Gain-Seeking Breach. Seller undertakes to manufacture a machine
for Buyer. Expected costs of production are 80, the price which is paid upfront is
The typical application of Calabresi & Melamed’s framework is intentional infliction of harm, as in
nuisance (pollution) cases. Is that framework suitable for accidental harms? Should a negligence rule be
characterized as a property or a liability rule? For the argument that negligence law should be characterized
as liability rules, see Porat, 2009, at pp. 199-200; for the counterargument, see Coleman & Kraus 1986;
Zipursky 1998, pp. 55-70.
4
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90, and the value of the machine to Buyer is 100. After the contract is concluded,
a second buyer shows up offering Seller 110 for the same machine. Seller can
produce only one machine at a time, so he breaches the contract with Buyer and
sells the machine to the second buyer. The only loss Buyer suffers is the
machine's lost value.
Example 2. Loss-Avoiding Breach. Seller undertakes to manufacture a machine
for Buyer. Expected costs of production are 80, the price which is paid upfront is
90, and the value of the machine to Buyer is 100. After the contract is concluded,
due to a shortage of manpower and materials, costs of production rise to 110.
Seller breaches the contract. The only loss Buyer suffers is the machine’s lost
value.
In both Examples 1 and 2, the breach of the contract is efficient. Under the
assumption of perfect compensation with expectation damages as the measure of
recovery, Seller pays damages of 100 to Buyer and reaps a benefit of 10 from the breach.
An implicit assumption in the argument that the breach in Examples 1 and 2 is efficient is
that due to high transaction costs, renegotiation between Seller and Buyer after
contracting is too costly, and with Example 1, high transaction costs also preclude the
sale of the machine (or assigning the right to the machine) by Buyer to the second buyer.
Indeed, damages remedy, like any liability rule (see Part I), could be justified only with
high transaction costs, since otherwise specific performance, like any property rule,
would be preferable.
With a remedy of specific performance, and with the assumption of high
transaction costs, in both examples Seller will perform the contract inefficiently.
Similarly, with disgorgement damages (in the amount of the profits made by Seller in
Example 1 or in the amount of the savings made by Seller in Example 2), Seller will lack
any motivation to breach efficiently since he gains nothing from a breach. Note that if
compensation is lower than expectation damages, Seller in both examples might breach
the contract even if performance is efficient. Thus, if damages are 90 (reliance damages),
Seller will breach even if the second buyer in Example 1 offers him 95, or if costs of
production in Example 2 rise to 95. In both cases the breach is inefficient but creates a
benefit of 5 to Seller, which might motivate him to breach.
The notion of efficient breach is justified not only by the general notion of
promoting social welfare, but also by the more specific idea of incomplete contracts
9

(Shavell 2009; Markovits and Schwartz 2011 & 2012). According to the incomplete
contracts idea, contract law provides the parties with default rules which apply to their
contracts unless they opt out of those rules. The default rules save the parties transaction
costs (in terms of negotiation and drafting costs), which they would have incurred but for
the default rules. In order to achieve their goal, the default rules should be compatible
with most parties’ interests, since otherwise most parties would opt out of the defaults
and transaction costs would increase rather than decrease. The default rules will be
compatible with most parties’ interests if they are efficient, viz., if they allocate risks and
provide the parties with incentives in ways which increase the contractual surplus. The
efficient breach idea—so the incomplete contracts argument goes—increases the
contractual surplus, and is therefore compatible with most contractual parties’ interests.
Therefore, it should be considered a desirable default rule. Note that increasing the
contractual surplus serves not only the promisor’s interest, but also the promisee’s, since
the expected benefit of the option to breach efficiently will be shared by the two parties
through price adjustment when making their contract. Therefore, basing the efficient
breach idea on the theory of incomplete contracts might be more effective in defending
this idea from deontological (or other non-utilitarian) attacks than basing it on the general
notion of promoting social welfare.
B. Refinements
The efficient breach argument is valid, as long as damages are fully compensatory. When
damages are under-compensatory, specific performance often becomes the most efficient
remedy. A notable category of cases where specific performance is the primary remedy
since damages are typically under-compensatory is the sale of unique goods. In a now
classical article, Anthony Kronman proposed a rationale for the willingness of courts to
allow specific performance when the contract’s subject matter is a unique, rather than
fungible, good. He suggested that with unique goods, far more so than with fungible
goods, there is a substantial risk of under-compensation of buyers for two reasons: first,
buyers often attach a subjective value to the unique good, and that value is not
compensated for in the event of breach. Second, subsequent to breach of unique good
contracts by sellers, buyers incur search costs in finding a substitute good, on top of the
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search costs they incurred when finding the original good, and those additional search
costs are also not compensated for (Kronman 1978). Since, according to Kronman, the
parties would prefer specific performance over damages if the benefit to the seller from
having the option to breach and pay damages is less than the costs of the breach to the
buyer, and since the costs of the breach to the buyer with unique goods are typically
higher than with fungible goods, Kronman concluded that specific performance would
more often be preferred by the parties with unique goods than with fungible goods.
Another assumption underlying the efficient breach argument relates to
transaction costs. In gain-seeking breaches such as in Example 1, the efficient breach
argument assumes that transaction costs make it hard, even impossible, for Buyer to find
the second buyer who values the subject matter of the contract more, and sell it to her.
When this assumption is relaxed, specific performance might be the most efficient
remedy.
In an article published shortly after Kronman’s article, Alan Schwartz argued for
a much broader application of specific performance than suggested by Kronman.
Schwartz claimed that the risk of under-compensation is substantial not only with unique
goods, as Kronman suggested, but also with many fungible goods (Schwartz 1979).
Furthermore, in contrast to Kronman, Schwartz claimed that the benefit to the seller of
having the option to breach and pay damages is often less with fungible goods than with
unique goods. Therefore, with fungible goods, the parties’ ex-ante preferences would not
necessarily warrant damages, rather than specific performance, as their preferred remedy.
Furthermore, for Schwartz, the central consideration in the choice between damages and
specific performance as a remedy is which one entails lower post-breach negotiation
costs. This depends, according to Schwartz, mostly on whether (in our Example 1) it is
easier for the seller or for the first buyer to find the second buyer who values the good
more than the first buyer: only if it is the seller could damages be preferable to specific
performance. Thomas Ulen took the argument for specific performance one step further,
suggesting that specific performance should be the routine remedy for breach. Ulen, like
Schwartz, regarded the post-breach negotiation costs as a central factor in the efficiency
of specific performance (Ulen 1984).
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While the first-generation writings on efficient breach focused on the promisor's
decision to perform or breach, Richard Craswell analyzed the effects of the contractual
remedies on various decisions made by the promisor and promisee (Craswell 1988).
Craswell considered the effect of the remedies on the decisions as to whether to enter into
the contract in the first place and what level of precautions to take in order to reduce the
probability of breach. Craswell explained that even if post-breach negotiation costs are
zero, the prevailing remedy will still affect the parties’ decisions made before the
promisor’s decision whether to perform or breach.
In the economic analysis of contract law it is implicitly assumed that the efficient
breach argument is equally valid with respect to both loss-avoiding and gain-seeking
breaches (Posner 2009). By contrast, lay people’s intuition is different: experimental
studies have indicated that people react more tolerantly to loss-avoiding breaches than to
gain-seeking breaches (Baron and Wilkinson-Ryan 2009). Moral philosophers have also
distinguished between the two types of breaches, arguing that a breach to pursue a gain is
more reprehensible than a breach to avoid a loss (Zamir and Medina 2010, p. 265).
Lastly, behavioral law and economics could explain people’s different reactions to the
two types of breach as a reflection of people’s different attitudes to losses as opposed to
gains (Cohen and Knetsch 1992; cf. Zamir and Ritov 2010). Recently Maria Bigoni,
Stefania Bortolotti, Francesco Parisi & Ariel Porat suggested that also from an economics
perspective, the case for allowing the promisor an option to breach is typically more vital
in loss-avoiding breaches than in gain-seeking breaches (Bigoni et el. 2014).
C. The Promisee’s Incentives
While the effects of remedies on the incentives of the promisor have been thoroughly
analyzed in the literature, only a few scholars have analyzed their effects on the
promisee’s incentives.5 A notable exception is Robert Cooter who pointed out that with
full compensation the victim’s incentives are eroded and over-reliance might result
(Cooter 1985). For example, if the promisee knows that there is a high likelihood of a
breach, he might rely as if the likelihood of a breach is zero, knowing that he can reap the
5

For an analysis of the mitigation of damages defense, see Goetz & Scott 1983. But the mitigation of
damages defense applies only after a breach (or an anticipatory breach) occurs, and it is effective only
when the victim's behavior is verifiable.
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benefits of reliance if performance takes place but externalizes its costs to the promisee–
who will reimburse him for those costs–if a breach occurs. Cooter suggested that when
damages to the promisee are awarded at a fixed amount, the promisee relies efficiently
since he fully internalizes both the costs and benefits of his reliance. Thus, liquidated
damages, if they are set at the level of expected harm and remain invariant with respect to
actual harm, might solve the over-reliance problem.6
Robert Cooter and Ariel Porat discussed the erosion of the victim’s incentives
not only with respect to over-reliance, but also with respect to noncooperation (Cooter &
Porat 2002). They noted that with fully compensatory damages the promisee who could
cooperate with the promisor and reduce the probability of a breach might be unwilling to
do so, especially if noncooperation is nonverifiable (otherwise a duty of cooperation or a
comparative fault defense could solve the problem (Porat 2009)). Cooter and Porat
suggested a novel theoretical solution which they called “anti-insurance.” According to
their solution, the promisee and promisor make a contract with a third party (“antiinsurer”) according to which the promisee assigns his right to damages to the anti-insurer,
so that in case of a breach the promisee receives no compensation and the promisor pays
fully compensatory damages to the anti-insurer. Before a breach occurs the anti-insurer
pays to the promisor and promisee for the valuable right to collect damages in case of a
breach. Both the promisor and promisee now have efficient incentives since they fully
internalize the costs and benefits of the precautions they will take to reduce the
probability of a breach or reduce over-reliance.
Another more practical solution for improving the promisee’s incentives is to
under-compensate her. With the risk of under-compensation, the promisee will be more
willing to cooperate or avoid over-reliance than with fully compensatory damages.
Indeed, with imperfect compensation the promisor’s incentives are deficient, but once the
promisee’s incentives are taken into account allowing some level of under-compensation
could be optimal (Cooter and Porat 2004).

6

But may create other inefficiencies: see infra Section IV.B.
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III. Scope of Liability
Not all harms are compensable and not all victims can recover. First, in both torts and
contracts only foreseeable harms are recoverable. Second, in tort law, proximate cause is
a limit to liability: if the harm is too remote liability will not be imposed. Third, in
negligence law, liability will be imposed only if the negligent injurer owed a duty of care
to the victim. Both proximate cause and duty of care are used by courts as a means to
limit liability for policy considerations (Restatement 3d Torts: Liability for Physical and
Emotional Harm, § 7, cmt. a, 2010; Dobbs 2000, p. 448). This section discusses several
topics, all of which raise questions as to the appropriate scope of liability.
A. Foreseeability
In both torts and contracts foreseeability of losses is a precondition for the imposition of
liability (Dobbs 2000, pp. 443-470; Farnsworth 2004, pp. 792-799). There are several
efficiency justifications for this requirement.
First, if the losses are not foreseeable there is no sense in imposing liability for
their materialization, since such liability will not affect the behavior of the injurer or the
promisor. That is because if losses are unforeseeable the costs of taking them into
account when deciding which precautions to take are prohibitively high, so the injurer
and the promisor will ignore them anyway, with or without liability (Landes and Posner
1987, pp. 246-247).
Second, in negligence, when injury of any kind is unforeseeable—namely, the
probability of an injury is very low—expected harm is low and the costs of precautions
typically exceed expected harm. When the costs of precautions are higher than expected
harm the injurer is non-negligent and liability should not be imposed. According to this
justification for the foreseeability requirement, the unforeseeability of any injury is an
indicator that there is no negligence on the injurer’s part to begin with. Note that this
justification applies to a narrow set of cases where any injury—as opposed to only the
one which resulted in the litigated losses—is unforeseeable.
Third, on many occasions the unforeseeable losses are foreseeable for the
promisee and victim. In such cases the promisee and victim are typically the cheapest
cost-avoiders of the unforeseeable losses, while the injurer and promisor are not. Leaving
14

the unforeseeable losses on the victim’s and promisee’s shoulders motivates them to take
measures to avoid those losses, either before or after the wrong or breach takes place.
This is especially essential when those measures are nonverifiable, and neither the
comparative fault nor the mitigation of damages defense is applicable.
Fourth and last, in the contractual context the foreseeability requirement
incentivizes the promisee to disclose private information to the promisor regarding the
promisee’s unforeseeable losses, which is vital to the promisor for the purpose of
deciding whether to breach or perform, and what level of precautions to take to avoid a
breach. This justification for the foreseeability requirement is relevant, when conveying
information from one party to another is possible and when the unforeseeable losses are
foreseeable for the promisee (Ayres and Gertner 1989). To better understand this
justification, assume that the promisee’s expected losses from a breach are 100 and
foreseeable for her, but only a loss of 10 is foreseeable for the promisor. Without the
foreseeability requirement, the promisee would not convey to the promisor any
information regarding his high potential losses, since if the promisor knew about that, he
would charge a higher price for his undertakings. As a result, with only partial
information, the promisor would have deficient incentives to perform. In contrast, with
the foreseeability requirement, the promisee would convey the information regarding her
high potential losses to the promisor in order to make those losses foreseeable for him
and therefore recoverable by the promisee. Conveying the information would secure the
promisor’s efficient incentives, thereby increasing the contractual surplus.
B. Pure Economic Loss
Victims often suffer pure economic losses. In contracts, losses are often purely economic
in the sense that the promisee lost profits and nothing else, but as has already been
explained, liability is routinely imposed and for good economic reasons.7 In torts, in
contrast, courts are commonly reluctant to impose liability for pure economic losses.
There are several efficiency considerations which could justify this reluctance.

7
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First, pure economic losses are often a private rather than a social cost8 (Bishop
1982). Imagine an injurer who created a nuisance to restaurateur 1, who shut down his
restaurant for a week and lost profits of 100. Assume that the restaurant’s patrons fully
mitigated their losses by dining during that week at another restaurant owned by
restaurateur 2. Further assume that the profits gained by restaurateur 2 from restaurateur
1’s patrons are 100, in addition to the regular profits made from his own regular patrons.
From a social perspective—so goes the economic argument—no social harm has been
done: profits were just transferred from one person to another. With no social harm,
injurers should not take any costly precautions, so liability should be nil.
This argument, however, has limits. To start with, if restaurateur 1 is a recurring
loser and restaurateur 2 a recurring winner, no liability might inefficiently suppress
restaurateur 1’s activity (Bishop 1982).
Second, with no liability, restaurateur 1 might take costly precautions to avoid
the harm; if the injurer, rather than restaurateur 1, is the cheapest cost-avoider, liability
would save the costs of precautions of restaurateur 1, even if at a cost to the injurer
who—given his expected liability—would take precautions and prevent the harm (DariMattiacci & Schäfer 2007).
Third, loss of profits—as in our example—are not necessarily just transfers of
value from one person to another: The destruction of input might increase the marginal
cost of production, leading to production decrease and higher prices (Rizzo, 1982a &
1982b).
Fourth, with pure economic losses causation is often hard to prove, so even if we
think that those losses should be prevented, there is a risk that with liability the injurer
will pay more than what he actually caused and be over-deterred. The reason why
causation is harder to prove in pure economic loss cases than in physical injury cases is
that those losses are of a type which occurs regularly with no wrongdoing, and therefore
it is hard to distinguish them from non-wrongful losses. To illustrate, assume that in the
8

This, however, is not always so. Sometimes pure economic losses are a substitute for physical losses
which are not compensated for practical reasons. For example, if the defendant polluted a river with
chemical effluents and destroyed the wildlife in a certain area, since no one in particular owns the wildlife,
recovery for the physical harm is impossible. Fishermen, however, might be able to recover for lost profits
even if those are pure economic losses: the lost profits could serve as a proxy for the social value of the lost
wildlife. Cf. Pruitt v. Allied Chemical Corp., 523 F. supp. 975 (1981).
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nuisance example, restaurant 1 was not shut down, but restaurateur 1 nonetheless lost
profits due to low attendance by patrons. Low attendance, however, could be caused by
many other causes—most of them non-wrongful—and it could be hard, sometimes even
impossible, to isolate the effects of the wrongful from those of the non-wrongful causes.
If courts tend to resolve uncertainties in favor of victims—and they are often so
inclined—they might impose too heavy a liability burden on the injurer (Abraham 2011,
pp. 1781-1783).
Fifth, pure economic losses often have two characteristics which make the victim
an especially effective cost-avoider. The first characteristic is, that those losses are
accumulated over time and therefore victims have a relatively long period of time to
mitigate them. The second characteristic—which has already been mentioned—is that
economic losses are of a type which occurs regularly with no wrongdoing; as a result,
victims have expertise in handling and reducing them. The nuisance case is not the best
example to illustrate these two characteristics, especially if the restaurant is shut down
because of the nuisance. So let’s take another example: suppose a person is wrongfully
injured in a road accident and has not showed up at work for two months. The injured
person’s employer argues that he has suffered pure economic losses in terms of lost
profits due to his employee’s absence from work. Obviously, the employer will not be
able to recover. A possible justification for this result is that the employer is a very
effective cost-avoider: her lost profits accumulate from day to day, so she has time to
consider how to mitigate them, e.g., by hiring a substitute employee, reducing her activity
level, or postponing the performance of some of the work for a few months. Furthermore,
the employer is accustomed to handle such losses on a daily basis—employees are often
absent from work for non-wrongful causes—and must have expertise in minimizing
them. Indeed, even if the employer had been entitled to compensation for her lost profits
she would have been required to mitigate those losses as a precondition for any recovery;
however, most of the employer’s failures to mitigate losses are nonverifiable, and
therefore the most effective way to encourage her to efficiently mitigate losses is just to
let her bear them.
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C. Non-Pecuniary Loss
Non-pecuniary losses are losses which have no economic impact on the victim, such as
emotional distress, agony, disappointment, and pain and suffering. In contracts, nonpecuniary losses are compensated almost only when the main interest protected by the
contract is non-pecuniary in nature (Farnsworth 2004, p. 810). Typical examples are tour
package contracts,9 contracts to perform cosmetic surgeries,10 and contracts for providing
services for weddings or funerals.11 In torts, non-pecuniary losses are typically
compensated when accompanied by physical injury, mainly bodily injury, and only rarely
when those are standalone losses (Dobbs 2000, pp. 1050-1053).
One objection to the imposition of liability for non-pecuniary losses is that those
losses are subjective, and therefore the risk of plaintiffs’ bringing frivolous claims is
high. If those claims were to be allowed—so the argument goes—injurers might pay
excessive damages and be over-deterred. This objection, however, is less persuasive
when there is some objective evidence for the existence of the non-pecuniary losses and
their magnitude, such as when the victim suffers pain and suffering accompanied by
bodily injury (Bovbjerg et al. 1989).
Another objection is that inflicting non-pecuniary losses on the victim typically
does not decrease her marginal utility of money, so transferring payments from the
injurer to the victim typically does not improve social welfare (cf. Shavell 1987, pp. 22831; Danzon 1984, pp. 517, 521). This objection is attenuated and even disappears when
deterrence is considered: since non-pecuniary losses are social losses, injurers and
promisors should internalize them (Rea 1982).
The marginal utility of money argument coupled with the countervailing
deterrence argument provides a compelling explanation of courts’ willingness to allow
compensation for non-pecuniary losses (almost) only when the interest protected by the
contract is mainly non-pecuniary. Imagine a construction contract between Builder and
Owner, where the parties anticipate when making their contract that with a certain
probability performance will be delayed and as a result Owner will be disappointed.
Would they agree that in case of a breach Owner will be compensated for his
9
10
11

Jarvis v. Swan Tours EWCA Civ 8 (1972).
Sullivan v. O'Connor 296 N.E. 2d 183 (1973).
Lewis v. Holmes 109 La. 1030 (1903).
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disappointment? If yes, liability should be the contractual default rule; otherwise, noliability should be the default rule.
Let’s start with the marginal utility of money argument. According to this
argument, Owner will never insure against disappointment loss, because suffering this
loss will not affect her marginal utility of money. Similarly, Owner will not “insure”
against such a loss through the contract (since he will be required to pay a premium
through the contract price). The deterrence argument does not change this conclusion, as
long as we assume that most of the losses resulting from the breach are pecuniary. Since
pecuniary losses are compensated, deterrence is reasonably attained, even if a small
fraction of the losses—those which are non-pecuniary—are not. Thus, in our example,
the marginal utility of money argument seems to overcome the countervailing deterrence
argument and the parties would prefer, ex ante, not to have liability for non-pecuniary
losses (cf. Rea 1982).
If instead, most of the losses expected to result from the breach are nonpecuniary, the conclusion will be different. Take, for example, a contract made between a
travel agency and a traveler for providing a package tour by the former to the latter. Here,
the efficient rule, which most contractual parties would prefer, is liability for nonpecuniary losses. Although the traveler would never insure against such losses with an
insurer, he would insure against them with the travel agency, since such “insurance”
would provide the agency with efficient incentives to perform the contract. In this
example, as opposed to the previous one, most of the expected losses are non-pecuniary,
and no liability for those losses would result in severe under-deterrence.12
D. Caps on Consequential Damages
The foreseeability requirement, which has been discussed in Section A, caps damages by
allowing recovery for foreseeable losses only. Contractual parties, however, often cap
damages even further, sometimes precluding liability for any consequential losses
altogether (Farnsworth 2004, p. 799).
One reason for contractual parties to cap consequential losses relates to the fact
that consequential losses are often unique to the promisee, as when the breach causes the
12

For the argument that victims might be willing to insure against non-pecuniary losses, see Croley &
Hanson 1995.
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promisee a loss of profits coming from third parties. In such cases the promisee can often
take steps to mitigate his consequential losses in nonverifiable ways, and making the
promisee bear those losses would incentivize him to do so. At the same time, because of
their uniqueness, those losses are often not accurately anticipated by the promisor (even if
they are foreseeable enough to pass the foreseeability threshold), and therefore capping
them promotes certainty. Indeed, without liability the promisor’s incentives to perform
efficiently decreases since he externalizes some of the costs of the breach to the
promisee, but given the advantages described above, this flaw might be a price worth
paying.13
A second reason, which applies mostly to consumer contracts, is that capping
damages is an effective tool for avoiding adverse selection. Take an example used in the
literature (Epstein 1989). A shipper ships packages for owners which sometimes are
damaged. Some packages are worth more, others worth less. The shipper charges a
uniform price (discriminating in prices is either too costly or illegal), and when a package
is damaged he is liable for the full amount of the harm done. Under this liability scheme,
owners whose packages are worth less than average subsidize owners whose packages
are worth more than average, since, by assumption, they all pay a uniform premium
through the price. This cross-subsidization is unjust, especially if owners of high-value
packages are typically wealthier than owners of low-value packages. Moreover, crosssubsidization results in inefficient consumption and adverse selection. Specifically,
because owners with low-value packages pay more than what they should have paid
given their low expected harm, their consumption level is too low; in contrast, because
owners with high-value packages pay less than what they should have paid given their
high expected harm, their consumption level is too high. In addition, in the long run,
because fewer owners of low-value packages will consume the shipping services, prices
will go up (since the average expected harm will go up). As a result, even fewer owners
of low-value packages will consume the shipping services, prices will go up again, and so
on and so forth. At the end, only consumers with very high-value packages will consume
the shipping services and, in the extreme case, the shipping services will shut down. One

13

Leaving some losses uncompensated also mitigates the promisee’s moral hazard problem: see Shavell
1979.
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way to solve the problem is to cap damages. Thus, the shipper could offer contracts to
consumers under which damages are limited to the value of low-value packages. This
would mitigate the inefficiencies, including the adverse selection problem, and would
also be more just. Consumers with high-value packages would be able to secure full
compensation through first-party insurance, if they choose to do so.

IV. The Measure of Recovery
Generally, in both torts and contracts damages are compensatory. But it may sometimes
be unclear what compensatory damages are. The first section deals with this question in a
very specific tort context: damages for bodily injury. The second section deals with one
contractual exception to the compensatory damages principle, which is liquidated
damages.
A. Bodily Injury and Lost Income
A major component in any award of damages for bodily injury is lost income. The result
is that a high-income (“rich”) victim receives compensation which is higher—sometimes
much higher—than what a low-income (“poor”) victim receives, even if both victims
suffer from the same bodily impairment because of the wrongdoing. By contrast, when
courts set the standard of care they do not distinguish between rich and poor victims: the
injurer is required to take the same level of care toward the victim regardless of his
income, even if his type as rich or poor can be anticipated by the injurer.14 This leads to
an inconsistency in tort law: there is a misalignment between the standard of care and
damages (Porat 2011). The following example illustrates this point.
Example 3. Poor and rich neighborhoods. John drives his car at a speed of 30
mph in a rich neighborhood. Unfortunately, he hits a pedestrian as she is crossing
the street. Had John driven a bit more slowly, he would have succeeded in
stopping his car in time and preventing the accident. A day later, John drives his
car again at the same speed, but this time in a poor neighborhood. Once again, he
hits a pedestrian. All driving conditions are exactly the same as they were in the
rich neighborhood the day before; therefore, in this case as well, the accident
would have been avoided had John driven his car a bit more slowly. Is it possible
that, under a rule of negligence, the same court would find John liable for the first
accident but not for the second?
14

When a victim’s type as rich or poor cannot be anticipated in advance by the injurer, there can be no
question that the standard of care should be set according to the average victim.
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Assuming that in the rich neighborhood most people have a higher income than
the residents of the poor neighborhood, one could argue that different standards of care
should be applied in the two neighborhoods. It is quite possible, even reasonable, then,
that the same court would find that: (a) John failed to take due care in the rich
neighborhood and therefore should be held liable toward his victim; and (b) John took
due care in the poor neighborhood and therefore should be exempt from all liability.
Courts, however, do not set different standards of care for driving in rich and
poor neighborhoods. Similarly, they also do not set different standards of care for doctors
treating rich and poor patients. If a court were required to explain the application of the
same standard of care for the rich and the poor, it would reason that the lives and limbs of
the rich and poor have identical social value and, therefore, are deserving of the same
level of legal protection. But such reasoning, convincing as it may be, is inconsistent with
the practice of awarding higher damages to rich victims. This practice suggests that rich
people’s lives and limbs are more highly valued by the law relative to poor victims. To be
consistent with this practice, so it seems, injurers should take greater care toward the rich
than the poor, just as they should be more careful in their interactions with high-value
property. Therefore, to restore consistency to the law, courts should have chosen one of
two routes: to either apply different standards of care to rich and poor victims (contrary to
what they actually do), coupled with different levels of compensation (as they actually
do), or, alternatively, to apply the same standard of care to rich and poor victims (as they
actually do), coupled with the same level of compensation (contrary to what they actually
do).
From a social perspective, there is no compelling reason why lost income should
be the main criterion for valuing people’s lives and limbs,15 but this question is beyond
the scope of this chapter. Therefore, let us assume first that lost income is the right
criterion, and consider the efficiency of the law under this assumption. If lost income is
the right criterion, and given that the standard of care is set uniformly according to
average income but damages are awarded in the amount of the victim’s lost income,
injurers will comply with the standard of care when they expect a rich victim but under15

Lost income could be correlated with people’s productivity. It is questionable, however, whether this
correlation is strong, and whether productivity is the main value of people’s lives and health.
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comply when they expect a poor victim. To see why, assume that the expected harm of
rich victims is 15, the expected harm of poor victims is 5, and average expected harm is
10. Further assume that the standard of care is set at 10, namely, injurers are required to
take precautions up to 10 to reduce the risk to either rich or poor victims. With these
figures, injurers will take precautions up to 10 toward rich victims (and pay no damages
if harm occurs) and up to 5 toward poor victims (and pay damages if harm occurs). Since
the expected harm for rich victims is 15 and for poor victims 5, injurers will be underdeterred toward rich victims and optimally-deterred toward poor victims.
Assume now that lost income is not the right criterion for awarding damages for
bodily injury, and that rich and poor people’s lives and limbs have the same value.
Further assume that people’s lives and limbs are determined by average income.16 Now,
taking precautions by injurers up to 10 toward rich victims is efficient, since their
expected harm is assumed to be 10. Conversely, taking precautions up to 5 toward poor
victims is inefficient, since 10, rather than 5, is assumed to be their expected harm.
The analysis so far has implicitly assumed no courts’ errors in setting the
standard of care and awarding damages and no injurers’ errors in anticipating courts’
decisions. With the risk of errors, the analysis becomes more complex (Porat 2011), but
does not change the basic conclusion: efficiency-wise,17 the value of people’s lives and
limbs should be reflected in both the standard of care and damages in a consistent
manner, otherwise inefficiencies will result.
B. Liquidated Damages
While the default rule in contract law is that damages are compensatory, the parties are
free to opt out of the default rule by incorporating a liquidated damages clause. If,
however, damages are set too high courts are authorized to strike down the liquidated
damages clause as being a penalty, and to award compensatory damages instead. When
deciding whether to uphold a liquidated damages clause, courts are instructed to consider
the anticipated loss at the time of contracting, the actual loss, and the difficulties of
proving the actual loss (Restatement 2d Contracts, §356, 1981). As liquidated damages
16

This is a simplifying assumption: a plausible argument is that average income should also not play a
major role in valuing victims’ lives and limbs (Friedman 1982; Porat & Tabbach 2011).
17
Distributive justice considerations could provide at least a partial explanation for the inconsistency in the
law (Porat 2011, at pp. 105-7).
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are closer to both anticipated and actual losses, and as there are more difficulties in
proving actual loss, courts are more willing to uphold the liquidated damages clause. The
Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC") adds a fourth consideration to be taken into account,
which is “the inconvenience or nonfeasibility of otherwise obtaining an adequate
remedy” (UCC, §2-718).
It is puzzling why courts are authorized to scrutinize liquidated damages clauses,
while they are generally not authorized to do the same thing with other clauses. (Posner
1979, p. 290). Indeed, at least when the parties are rational and well-informed, there is no
reason to assume that the liquidated damages clause they incorporated into their contract
sets damages too high (Schwartz 1990). In the next paragraphs both the advantages and
disadvantages of liquidated damages are discussed, when the question which arises is
whether the disadvantages can justify the wide discretion granted to courts to strike down
liquidated damages clauses.
Incorporating a liquidated damages clause into their contracts has several
advantages for the parties. First, it saves litigation costs. Indeed, since the actual loss is a
consideration for the court whether to uphold the clause, the parties might litigate as to
the exact magnitude of the actual loss. But that would not be necessary in most cases,
since as long as the gap between the actual loss and liquidated damages is not large,
courts will tend to uphold the clause; on many occasions, the defendant will not even try
to argue that the gap is large, and it would not be necessary to litigate about actual losses
(Goetz and Scott 1977).
Second, a liquidated damages clause promotes certainty since with this clause the
parties can accurately anticipate the amount of damages to be paid by the promisor to the
promisee in case of a breach. This advantage is prevalent if the liquidated damages clause
sets both a floor and a ceiling, as is the case when the parties have not agreed otherwise.
Third, a liquidated damages clause protects interests which otherwise are not
adequately protected by contract law. Thus, if the parties anticipate that a breach would
result in non-pecuniary losses, or losses which are hard to prove (such as reputational
losses), they might incorporate into their contract a liquidated damages clause relating to
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such losses (Goetz and Scott 1977). Consequently, not only will compensation be
secured, but the promisor's incentives will improve as well.18
Fourth, a liquidated damages clause is a solution to the promisee’s over-reliance
problem: as has been explained, with liquidated damages the promisee internalizes both
the costs and benefits of his reliance and therefore relies efficiently.19
Fifth and last, a liquidated damages clause enables the promisor to signal his
credibility to the promisee: by undertaking to pay a large enough amount of damages in
case of a breach, he is able to signal to the promisee that the probability of a breach is low
(Posner 2011, p. 160). Thus, a landlord might hesitate to lease his property to a tenant he
hardly knows, fearing the latter may damage the property or fail to evacuate it on time.
Given that the level of enforcement is lower than 100%, and given litigation costs, the
landlord’s entitlement to compensatory damages might not be a satisfactory guarantee for
the tenant’s performance and the landlord will not lease the property to her. If, however,
an enforceable liquidated damages clause, stipulating damages in an amount which is
much higher than expected losses, is incorporated into the contract, the landlord might be
convinced to lease his property to the tenant after all.
This advantage, however, is generally unattainable, since in order to attain it the
parties must stipulate damages in an amount which is much higher than both expected
and actual losses; courts would not enforce such a stipulation and would strike it down as
a penalty.
Liquidating damages clauses come at a cost: sometimes they might result in
inefficiencies. First, they might lead to inefficient breach or inefficient performance (and
also inefficient investment in precautions); the former will occur if liquidated damages
are lower than actual losses, the latter if they are higher than actual losses.20 If this were
the main disadvantage of liquidated damages clauses, courts’ power to strike them down
should have been a default rule. After all, it is for the parties to decide whether the
liquidated damages clause should be set aside if it largely deviates from actual losses.
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Although under-compensating some losses could improve the promisee’s incentives. See Shavell 1979.
Supra Section II.C.
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On the other hand, the promisor who is generally reluctant to breach, even efficiently, for moral reasons,
might be willing to breach when damages are stipulated in the contract. Cf. Wilkinson-Ryan 2010. Thus,
liquidated damages clauses might sometimes encourage efficient breaches.
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Second, if liquidated damages are sets too high, the promissee's expectation for
over-compensation might tempt her to inefficiently induce a breach in non-verifiable
ways (Clarkson, Miller and Muris 1978). This risk, however, is not necessarily a reason
for courts to intervene in liquidated damages clauses, as long as the parties are assumed
to be aware of such risk when stipulating damages in their contracts.
Third, because of lack of information, irrationality or bounded rationality, the
promisor might not be aware of the harsh consequences of a liquidated damages clause,
and agree to set it too high. For example, he might be overly optimistic about his ability
to perform the contract, believing he will almost never be subject to the liquidated
damages clause. Liquidated damages set too high might encourage the promisor to
overinvest in precautions and perform even when a breach is efficient. If this were the
main disadvantage of liquidated damages clauses, courts’ power to strike them down
should have been limited to cases where asymmetric information or irrationality is a real
concern, such as in some consumer contracts.
Forth, sometimes, through a liquidated damages clause, the parties might try to
externalize costs to third parties by setting damages much higher than what efficiency
requires. Thus, suppose that in our previous example the tenant is under a substantial risk
of bankruptcy and the landlord is aware of this. The parties might reach an agreement,
setting damages five times higher than anticipated losses, knowing that if the tenant
eventually goes bankrupt, part of the costs of the liquidated damages will be borne by his
creditors. In such cases, intervention by courts is essential regardless of the parties’
wishes, even if the parties are well informed and fully rational.21

V. Partial Recoveries
In this part, two concepts of partial recoveries are discussed: probabilistic recoveries and
offsetting risks. The first concept is well known and has been applied by courts in some
specific categories of cases, while the second is less known and has not been applied by
courts so far.

21

A liquidated damages clause which is above expected harm might have anti-competitive effects since it
makes the breach for the promisor very costly (Chung 1992; Spier and Whinston 1995).
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A. Probabilistic Recoveries
In civil cases the plaintiff succeeds in trial if he proves his case by a preponderance of the
evidence. The question which arises is whether in certain cases tort victims should be
entitled to a probabilistic recovery if they have failed to prove causation by a
preponderance of the evidence. Typical cases where this question emerges are medical
malpractice cases when the doctor’s negligence reduced the patient’s chances of recovery
and the patient eventually did not recover (King 1981; Levmore 1990; Porat and Stein
2001, pp. 122-5). For example, suppose that the patient’s chances of recovery were 30%,
but because of negligent misdiagnosis by the doctor those chances were reduced to zero.
The probability that the doctor’s negligence caused the patient’s non-recovery is 30%.
Should the patient recover for 30% of his losses since the doctor deprived him of his
chances of recovery?22 In some jurisdictions the answer is yes, while in others the answer
is no (Porat and Stein 2001, pp. 74-6).
Does efficiency require compensation in this case? Not necessarily, if we assume
that in the specific category of cases doctors handle not only cases of less than 50%
chances of recovery, but also cases of more than 50% chances of recovery, and there is
symmetry between the two groups of cases. With such symmetry, a doctor’s liability
would be the same under both a probabilistic recovery and a preponderance of the
evidence rule. To see why, imagine that a patient has either a 30% chance of recovery or
a 70% chance of recovery, with equal probabilities. The doctor is negligent and reduces
the patient’s chances of recovery to zero. The patient does not recover and suffers harm
of H. Under a probabilistic recovery rule, the negligent doctor’s expected liability is
50%x30%xH + 50%x70%xH = 50%H.23 Under a preponderance of the evidence rule, the
negligent doctor’s expected liability is the same: 50%x0 + 50%xH = 50%H.24 Liability of
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Suppose that chances of recovery were reduced by the doctor's negligence from 70% to 40% and the
patient has not recovered; under a probabilistic recovery rule the patient should recover 50%--not 30%--of
the ultimate harm, since the probability that she suffered that harm from the doctor's negligence is 50%
(Porat & Stein, at p. 124, 2001; Restatement 3d Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm, § 26,
cmt. n, 2010).
23
There is a probability of 50% that the patient has a 30% chance of recovery, and then liability would be
30%H, and there is a probability of 50% that the patient has a 70% chance of recovery, and then liability
would be 70%H.
24
There is a probability of 50% that the patient has a 30% chance of recovery, and then liability would be
zero, and there is a probability of 50% that the patient has a 70% chance of recovery, and then liability
would be H.
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50%H in this example is also efficient, since the expected harm of the doctor’s
negligence is 50%H.25
Things are different if there is an asymmetry between the two groups of cases.
Consider an extreme example where in a certain hospital department all the patients have
a less than 50% chance of recovery. Under a preponderance of the evidence rule, those
patients would never be entitled to compensation, since in each and every case when
harm occurs the probability that the negligent doctor caused the harm is less than 50%.
Therefore, under the latter rule, doctors will not be deterred. In contrast, under the
probabilistic recovery rule, patients who suffer harm will always be entitled to
compensation from negligent doctors, and the latter’s expected liability will equal
expected harm, as required for efficiency. Note that even when there is symmetry
between the two groups of cases, probabilistic recovery is essential, as long as the doctor
can identify in advance whether her patient has a less than or more than 50% chance of
recovery.
It is important to note that probabilistic recovery is more essential if the typical
case is less than 50% chance of recovery rather than more than 50% chance of recovery.
When chances are less than 50%, with a preponderance of the evidence rule, underdeterrence will result. When chances are more than 50%, with the same rule, overdeterrence might result, but only if we assume courts’ errors in setting the standard of
care and awarding damages or injurers’ errors in anticipating courts’ decisions. (Porat
2011, pp. 112-4).
To see why, suppose that in a certain hospital department all the patients have a
70% chance of recovery, and the harm, if it occurs, is H. Bearing these figures in mind,
the patient’s expected harm is 70%H, and the doctor should be required—efficiencywise—to take precautions up to 70%H. Would the doctor take higher precautions, since if
harm occurs he bears a liability of H? The answer is no: the doctor will take precautions
up to 70%H, thereby satisfying the standard of care and bearing no liability. The doctor
might, however, over-comply if there is a risk of courts’ errors in setting the standard of
care and awarding damages or injurers’ errors in anticipating courts’ decisions. Since
25

There is a probability of 50% that the patient has a 30% chance of recovery, and then expected harm is
30%H, and there is a probability of 50% that the patient has a 70% chance of recovery, and then expected
harm is 70%H. Thus, expected harm is 50%x30%xH + 50%x70%xH = 50%H.
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such risk is common, the probabilistic recovery rule might be superior to a preponderance
of the evidence rule, not only in less-than-50% chance cases, but also in more-than-50%
chance cases.
Beyond lost chances of recovery cases, the Market Share Liability doctrine
(MSL), which is a form of probabilistic recovery rule, has been applied by courts in some
jurisdictions. In one case to which the doctrine was applied, numerous manufacturers
produced the same generic drug, which later was found to be defective and harmful.
Since in most cases plaintiffs could not tell which manufacturer’s drug caused their harm,
a preponderance of the evidence rule allowed all manufacturers in most suits to escape
liability. Under MSL, however, each manufacturer was required to bear liability
according to his market share at the relevant time with respect to the harmful drug. Thus,
if one manufacturer’s market share was 10%, he was required to compensate each and
every plaintiff who suffered harm of H, in the amount of 10%H (Porat and Stein 2001,
pp. 58-69). Although MSL does not provide fully efficient incentives to injurers, it is
more efficient than no liability. Inefficiency might still result because the manufacturers’
behaviors are often nonverifiable, and even with MSL a manufacturer might refrain from
taking costly but efficient precautions, since most of the benefits of his precautions would
be captured by the other manufacturers (Cooter and Porat 2007).
B. Offsetting Risks
Consider the following example (Porat 2011):
Example 4. Choosing between two medical treatments. A doctor must decide
between Treatment A and Treatment B for his patient.26 Each treatment entails
different risks but produces the same utility if the risks do not materialize. This
utility is much greater than the respective risks of each treatment. The costs of
administering the treatments are the same, and the costs of choosing between
them are low. Treatment A entails a risk of 500 to the patient’s left arm (there is a
probability of .01 that the treatment will produce harm of 50,000), and Treatment
B entails a risk of 400 to the patient’s right arm (there is a probability of .01 that
the treatment will produce a harm of 40,000). The risks of Treatments A and B
are not correlated: the realization of the risk from one treatment has no bearing on
the probability of the realization of the risk from the other treatment. The doctor
negligently chooses Treatment A, and a harm of 50,000 materializes. Should the
doctor be held liable? If so, in what amount?
26

Note that one of the treatments could be an omission, such as not operating on the patient or not
administering a certain medicine.
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Under prevailing tort law, the doctor in Example 4 would be found liable because
he was negligent: he could have reduced the total risk to the patient by 100 (500-400) at a
low cost, but failed to do so. The negligent doctor’s liability under prevailing tort law
would amount to the entire harm, which is 50,000, since that is the harm caused by his
negligence. Thus, while the net risk created by the doctor’s negligence is 100, his
expected liability is five times higher: .01 x 50,000 = 500. The reason for the
misalignment between net risk and expected liability is that tort law ignores the fact that
the negligent doctor, by choosing treatment A, not only increased the risk to the patient's
left arm (of 500), but also decreased the risk to the patient's right arm (of 400). If the
doctor bears liability for the increased risk (internalizes the negative externalities),
without being credited for the decreased risk (does not internalize the positive
externalities), his expected liability will be higher, even much higher, than social costs,
which are the net rather than the gross risk.
Liability for far more than social costs is likely to result in over-deterrence,
which in the medical context often takes the form of defensive medicine. Over-deterrence
and defensive medicine will result if there are courts’ errors in setting the standard of care
and awarding damages or doctors’ errors in anticipating courts’ decisions
(nonverifiability of some harms but not others is a typical problem leading to defensive
medicine). As doctors pay more in damages, over-deterrence and defensive medicine
become more severe (Porat 2007).
To restore the alignment between social costs and expected liability, the doctor’s
liability in Example 4 should be 10,000 rather than 50,000. Liability of 10,000 would
result in this example in expected liability of 100, which is the social cost of the doctor’s
negligence. In more general terms, a doctor’s liability should be H(Ra-Rb)/Ra, where H
stands for the materialized harm, Ra for the risk which was increased by the doctor’s
negligence and materialized into harm, and Rb for the risk which was decreased by the
doctor’s negligence.
The same formula can be applied to other cases where an injurer increased the
risks to person A and decreased the risks to person B (Porat 2007) (although such
application is expected to raise objections mainly from non-economic lawyers). In such
cases, as long as a restitution claim against person B is legally or practically impossible,
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there is room for the argument that, efficiency-wise, the injurer’s liability toward person
A should be decreased in accordance with the risks reduced to person B. A similar
argument applies to cases where person B received a certain benefit (as opposed to a
probabilistic benefit in terms of decreasing B’s exposure to risks): as long as the benefit
is social rather than private, and some other conditions are met, offsetting the benefit
from damages awarded to person A would be justified (again, under the assumption that a
restitution claim against person B is legally or practically impossible). (Porat and Posner
2014).
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